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Abstract
In May 1996 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Rhode Island’s ban on advertising
prices of alcoholic beverages, making Rhode Island the subject of a natural experiment for
measuring the impact of advertising on prices. Using Massachusetts prices as controls, we
find that while advertising stores substantially cut prices of advertised products, prices of
other products, at both advertising and non-advertising stores rise under the advertising
regime. We investigate stores' pricing responses to rivals' price advertising and find that
small, non-advertising stores raise their prices of products advertised by rivals beyond
their baseline price increase, while larger, advertising stores raise by less their prices of
rival-advertised products.  We find no reductions in price dispersion across stores with the
introduction of price advertising.  However, those stores that choose to advertise do have
lower averages prices both before and after the law change.  Indirect information on
quantities sold, based on Rhode Island Lottery ticket sales, indicate that newspaper-
advertising stores draw a higher share of customers after they advertise than before.
We are grateful to Mary Benner, Jerry Drummond, Tim Groseclose, and Hannah
Waldfogel for help gathering data.  Chris Dulude of the Rhode Island Lottery provided
information on lottery sales.  Seminar participants at Wharton and Yale provided helpful
comments.1
I. Introduction
In the past two decades economists have devoted a substantial amount of effort at
empirical measurement of the effect of price advertising on prices.  These inquiries have
their theoretical origin primarily in Stigler's (1961) work on the economics of
information.
1  The most common approach to this question has been cross sectional: how
do prices vary between jurisdictions that allow and forbid price advertising?
2   These
studies generally find that the mean and variance of prices are higher in jurisdictions that
forbid advertising, which the authors interpret to mean that advertising reduces prices and
their dispersion.  Despite the appeal of these studies, their underlying cross-jurisdictional
data have inherent limitations.  Attributing inter-jurisdictional differences in prices to inter-
jurisdictional differences in advertising ignores the possible endogeneity of advertising.
Advertising bans are legislative in origin and may themselves depend on other
determinants of prices.
3  Because most existing studies are based on cross sectional
comparisons, they do not control for unobserved firm specific or market specific effects on
price.
4
We make use of an exogenous change in price advertising to measure its effect on
price distributions.  In the 44 Liquormart case the U.S. Supreme Court overturned a
Rhode Island ban on advertising the prices of alcoholic beverages.  Prior to May 13, 1996,
                                                       
1 See also Nelson (1970, 1974).
2 This is the approach of Benham (1972), Feldman and Begun (1978), and Kwoka (1984), who compare
prices of eyeglasses and optometric services across states, Cady (1976), who compares prescription drug
prices across states, and Maurizi (1972), who compares gasoline prices across cities.
3 For example, we might expect more lobbying for advertising restrictions in states with fewer
concentrated sellers, where we would also see higher prices.
4 A significant exception to the cross sectional studies is Glazer (1981), who examines the prices of six
commonly advertised grocery items during and after a newspaper strike that substantially limited the
amount of price information communicated through advertising.  We discuss this study further below.2
Rhode Island retailers could not advertise prices in any way.
5   Since 1956, Rhode Island
had explicit prohibitions on the publication or broadcast of the prices of alcoholic
beverages.  While Rhode Island argued before the Supreme Court that the law was
designed to promote temperance, Evan Lawson, the attorney arguing the case against the
ban, claimed that "everybody in the courtroom knew that the in reality the ban was a way
of helping liquor dealers fix prices."   Newspaper accounts (Mulligan, 1995) acknowledge
"little dispute that a byproduct of the ban has been to assist "mom and pop" package
stores that tend to charge higher prices than bigger retailers."   The Rhode Island Liquor
Stores Association's support of the ad ban, because "smaller retailers would be devastated
by the kind of advertising splash that big chains would sponsor," is consistent with
Lawson's claim.  The Supreme Court rejected Rhode Island's defense of the law, in part
because temperance could be advanced by more direct means, such as higher taxes.
This decision made Rhode Island the subject of a natural experiment for testing the
effects of price advertising on both the level and variation of market prices.  For our study
we collected longitudinal data on Rhode Island retail prices of alcoholic beverages, as well
as two controls for retail prices, Rhode Island wholesale price and retail prices in
neighboring Massachusetts, where price advertising had been legal and remained so.
Our context is well suited for such a study, both because we have exogenous
variation in advertising and because of the homogeneous nature of the good (identical
                                                       
5 Not only could they not advertise in the media, they could not post prices in their windows or on signs
outside their stores.  Stores were forbidden even from sending or faxing price information to customers.
John Haronian, owner of 44 Liquormart, initially challenged the advertising restriction when he was cited
for using the word "wow" in an ad that included prices of peanuts and potato chips along with pictures of
various liquor products.  At the urging of Haronian’s competitors, the State of Rhode Island interpreted
the ad as an illegal suggestion about prices (interview with John Haronian).  See also Andrews
Publications (1996).3
across stores).  Alcoholic beverages differ across stores primarily only in price and
location only (although stores do differ in atmosphere and product variety).  Hence, theory
predicts that the presence of better information about prices and availability should
increase customers' demand elasticities for particular stores' products and reduce the mean
and variance of prices across stores.
6  On the other hand, our context is complicated by
the presence of many products.  Even when they advertise, liquor stores communicate
information about only a tiny fraction of their products' prices.
In addition to measuring the overall effect of advertising on prices, we also attempt
to document the mechanism by which advertising affects prices.  Does advertising only
reduce prices of advertised products and only at the stores that advertise?  Or does
advertising reduce average prices of products at advertising stores, regardless of whether
the products are advertised?  Does the effect of advertising propagate across stores, so
that all stores, including non-advertising stores, reduce their prices?  Or, having lost the
elastic demanders to advertising stores, do non-advertising stores raise their prices for the
remaining inelastic consumers?  Furthermore, how do rivals’ price advertisements affect
prices?  We address these questions by estimating separate effects of the change in the law
on prices at advertising and non-advertising stores.  We also measure how the effects vary
according to whether products are advertised at a rival's store.
                                                       
6 In general, economic theory offers no unambiguous predictions about whether advertising is pro-
competitive or anti-competitive  (Comanor and Wilson, 1979).  In addition to the informational role of
advertising, advertising may persuade consumers to be brand loyal, thereby decreasing the price elasticity
of demand for branded products and creating barriers to entry.  However, given the context of our study,
the short run effects of price advertising at retail outlets, we do not expect advertising to foster “retail store
loyalty” in a manner analogous to which brand advertising may foster brand loyalty.  Further, recent
longitudinal studies of advertising restrictions have found that such regulations increase the concentration
of sales among top-selling brands (Eckard, 1991; Sass and Saurman, 1995).4
Although we find that stores substantially reduce the prices of products they
advertise, we find, surprisingly, that advertising raises other prices, both at advertising and
non-advertising stores.
7  Our results also reveal something about how stores set prices in
response to rivals' price advertising.  Large, newspaper-advertising stores, raise their
prices less on products advertised elsewhere.  Small, non-advertising stores raise their
prices more on products advertised elsewhere.  Nevertheless, advertising appears to be a
valuable signal.  Advertising stores have lower prices on average than other stores.
Further, consumers apparently heed these signals:  Indirect information on quantities sold,
based on Rhode Island Lottery ticket sales, suggests that advertising stores draw a higher
share of customers after they advertise than before.
The paper proceeds in four sections.  First, we describe the existing empirical
literature, its appeal, and the shortcomings inherent in the data researchers have examined.
Second, we describe the data employed in the current study.  Third, we present our
measurement strategy.  Fourth, we present results and some speculation about
interpretation.  A brief conclusion follows.
II. Review of Relevant Literature
Most empirical work on the effect of advertising on prices relies on cross-sectional
comparisons of prices in jurisdictions allowing and forbidding price advertising.  This is
the approach of Benham (1972), who compares eyeglass prices across states, Cady (1976)
who compares prescription drug prices across states, Maurizi (1972), who compares retail
                                                       
7 An important deviation to the conventional wisdom is Peters (1984).  He develops a theoretical
explanation for the possibility that price advertising can raise average price in an industry.  Firms5
gasoline prices across cities, and Feldman and Begun (1978, 1980) and Kwoka (1984),
who compare prices of optometric services across states.  These studies generally,
although not always – see Maurizi (1972) – find that prices are higher in jurisdictions
forbidding advertising.
Identifying the effect of advertising in cross sectional data requires a strong and
questionable assumption, that advertising restrictions are exogenous to prices.  It is
difficult to know whether estimated relationships between advertising permissibility and
prices reflect an effect of advertising on prices or whether they reflect the influence of
some third factor on both.
8
Glazer’s (1981) study of the effect of advertising on grocery prices is a significant
exception to the cross-sectional studies listed above.  He identifies the effect of advertising
using exogenous variation in advertising provided by a newspaper strike.  He compares
the evolution of prices at stores that generally advertise, but are unable to advertise during
the strike, with the evolution of prices at “control” advertising stores that to continue to
advertise, unaffected by the strike. He finds that the stores that stop advertising raise their
prices, relative to the controls, during the strike and reduce them again afterward.
By design Glazer’s study includes only commonly advertised produce and meat
products.  Hence, Glazer’s results address the question of how advertising affects the
prices of advertised products at the stores advertising them.  In an environment such as a
grocery (or liquor) store, which carries many products and advertises prices of relatively
                                                                                                                                                                    
prefer price advertising over price discounts as a method of attracting customers, but prefer to use one of
these methods to none.
8 Benham (1972) recognizes the possibility that advertising restrictions may proxy for other regulations or
market conditions.  He recommends that future research examine the effects of changes in advertising
restrictions on changes in price levels.6
few products, this distinction is important.  He finds that advertising reduces the price of
advertised products at stores that advertise but that advertising has no effect on the prices
of the advertised products at smaller stores that do not normally advertise.  Because
Glazer includes only commonly advertised products in his sample, his results do not
measure the effect of a store's advertising on its prices of products that it does not
advertise.  Our measurement approach is similar to Glazer’s.  However, our sampling
approach is quite different.  We seek to include a representative group of products (not
simply those with prices that are commonly advertised).
III. Data
The basic information for this study are a longitudinal data set consisting of 6480
observations on the retail and wholesale prices of 33 alcoholic beverage products at  about
100 stores in Rhode Island and Massachusetts between June 1995 and June 1997.  In
addition to price information, we also collected information about advertising, both
storefront ("window") and newspaper.  Finally, we have indirect information on quantities
sold at Rhode Island stores from lottery sales, by store.
1. Price Data Collection Procedure
Liquor stores sell hundreds of products, and because few liquor stores in either
Massachusetts or Rhode Island employ checkout scanners, it is not feasible to collect data
on the prices of all products.  Recognizing this, we contacted some liquor retailers to
devise a list of widely-available products (see the products listed in table 1).  On our first
store visits to collect data, we learned that many retailers object to data gathering in their7
stores.
9  At times we therefore narrowed our products to a shorter list of roughly 10
products whose prices we could collect by memorizing.
10
We began collecting data in June, 1995 when we learned that the U.S. Supreme
Court had agreed to hear the 44 Liquormart case in its next term.  We therefore knew
only that a decision would arrive between the fall of 1995 and summer of 1996.  We
expected the Supreme Court to declare the advertising ban unconsititutional, and we
sought a data set including both pre- and post- law change retail price information.  Unless
prices were expected to remain constant in the absence of a change in the law, we could
not measure the effect of the change in the law using only data on Rhode Island retail
prices.  Rather, we needed some controls showing how retail prices would have evolved in
the absence of change in the law.
We obtained two controls for Rhode Island retail prices.  First, we obtained retail
price data for Massachusetts, where liquor price advertising was already legal and would
remain so.  We selected Massachusetts, both because it is adjacent to Rhode Island and
because the Providence metropolitan area is essentially contiguous with Boston’s.  Hence,
we expected factors apart from the possible law change and - therefore retail prices - to
evolve similarly in both places.
11  Second, we collected information on wholesale liquor
                                                       
9 When asked, one store manager said, "I don't allow that kind of thing in my store."  Even when the
owner was not present, store employees were generally reluctant to allow us to gather price data.
10 As the numbers of observations in table 1 indicate, the short-list products include: Jack Daniels (1 liter),
Budweiser 12-pack (cans), Samuel Adams 6-pack (bottles), E & J Gallo Chardonnay, Kaluha (1liter), and
Freixenet Cordon Negro and Korbel Brut sparkling beverages (all .75 liter).
11 We recognize that wholesale and retail liquor sales are regulated at the state level and that this
regulation is different in Rhode Island and Massachusetts.  For example, while Massachusetts has
multiple distributors for each product, Rhode Island has only one distributor for each.  However, with the
exception of the anticipated change in Rhode Island advertising, we had no reason to expect differences in
state regulation to affect the time pattern of prices in Massachusetts relative to Rhode Island.  Of course,
for the period prior to the change in the law, this is testable.8
prices in Rhode Island.  These data are published each month in the Rhode Island
Beverage Journal.  While the published prices do not reflect quantity discounts and
therefore may be inaccurate in their levels, if their time pattern in the absence of a law
change matches that of retail prices, then we can use them as control for retail prices.
An assumption implicit in the use of the Rhode Island wholesale liquor price as a
control for the RI retail price is that the markup would be stable in the absence of the law
change.   To deal with the possibility that the Rhode Island markup might not have been
constant in the absence of the law change, we obtained MA markup data as a control for
Rhode Island markup.  We collected Massachusetts wholesale price data from the
Massachusetts Beverage Price Journal.  Using RI and MA markup data together, we can
measure the effect of advertising as the change in Rhode Island markup less the change in
the Massachusetts markup.
Our retail price data were collected on 540 store visits in the two states.  Our store
visits took place at approximately quarterly intervals. In June 1995, we visited 22 stores in
Rhode Island and 19 stores in Massachusetts.  In October 1995 we visited another 30
stores in Rhode Island and 39 stores in Massachusetts.  In February 1996 we visited a
third group of stores in each of the states (16 in RI, 11 in MA).  The Supreme Court
decided 44 Liquormart on May 13, 1996 by a 9-0 vote for the plaintiff, immediately lifting
Rhode Island’s ban on liquor price advertising.  In June 1996 we visited all of the stores in
both states.  In September 1996 we visited the stores initially visited in September 1995.
We visited all of the stores in December 1996 and March 1997.  We visited roughly half of
the stores in June 1997.  We visited a total of 58 different RI stores.  This is one quarter of9
the 232 retail liquor stores in the state, according to the GTE Superpages
(http://www.yp2.net).
The sample includes stores in three areas of Rhode Island and Massachusetts:
1) Southern Rhode Island.  All stores in Warwick, Cranston, North Kingstown, East
Greenwich, West Warwick, and Exeter, as well as stores adjacent to these towns in
Johnston, South Kingstown, and Coventry.
2) Northwest Boston Suburbs.  Stores in the northwest-of-Boston towns of Bedford,
Billerica, Burlington, Everett, Lexington, Malden, Reading, Stoneham, Winchester,
and Woburn.
3) Rhode Island/Massachusetts Border.  All stores in the town of East Providence, RI
and four stores in adjacent Seekonk, MA.
While we do not directly observe quantities sold, we do observe a relevant proxy
for Rhode Island stores' sales, their sales of Rhode Island Lottery tickets.  The Rhode
Island Lottery Commission provided us with lottery ticket sales, by agent, for five separate
time periods surrounding the period of our study, one entirely before the law change and
three entirely after (see table 10).
2. Sample Characteristics
Table 1 shows the 33 products included in the sample, along with their average
prices and sample sizes.   Products in the sample range in price between an average of
$3.16 for a 6-pack of Narragansett beer and $30.07 for a 0.75 liter bottle of Moet &
Chandon Brut champagne.  Table 2 shows the average markups, by state and product
group.  Rhode Island markups average 11.46%, while markups in Massachusetts average10
15.21%.   In Rhode Island, markups are highest on beer (15.43%) and lowest on
champagne (7.96%).  In Massachusetts, markups are highest for wine (21.65%, although
the beer markup is only slightly lower at 21.32%) and lowest for champagne (8.32%).  We
collected 2844 retail price observations in Rhode Island and 3636 in Massachusetts.
3.  Advertising after the Ban
After the ban on advertising was lifted in Rhode Island, some retailers began to
advertise, while others did not.  We have systematic data on two forms of price
advertising, newspaper and storefront window, both of which were illegal in Rhode Island
prior to May 1996.  We have data on price ads in windows as well as the area's only major
newspaper, the Providence Journal Bulletin, for the entire year following the change in
the law.  At each store visit, we kept a record of whether the store posted prices outside
the store.  Hence, we know whether sample stores display prices in windows at the times
of our store visits.  We monitored all regional editions of the Providence Journal Bulletin
for liquor store ads during the months of data collection from the time that the advertising
ban was lifted until June of 1997.  We collected all information on newspaper liquor price
advertising in the Journal Bulletin, not only the ads for stores in our sample.  This is
important, because it allows us to measure the effect of rivals' ads on stores' prices, as well
as the effect of own ads.
Table 3 shows the fraction of sampled stores posting prices in windows for each
period following the 44 Liquormart decision. In the first month following the decision,
nearly a third of the Rhode Island stores in the sample began to post prices.  By a year
after the decision, nearly half of the Rhode Island stores posted prices outside.  By11
contrast, all but one of the Massachusetts stores posted prices outside during the entire
sample period.
Newspaper advertising is less common than window advertising.  Of 58 stores in
the Rhode Island sample, nine advertised in the newspaper in the year after the law
changed.  Column 3 of table 3 shows the number of RI sample stores with newspaper ads.
Because our sample includes only a quarter of RI liquor stores, the volume of ads for
sample stores understates the total number of stores communicating price information
through newspaper ads.  Column 4 shows the total number (in- and out-of-sample) of
stores running newspaper ads in effect during the months of our data collection.  The
following two columns indicate the number of ads in effect during each data collection
month, for RI sample stores and all RI stores, respectively.  Advertising reaches a clear
peak in December 1996.
12
The final two columns indicate whether stores offer price-matching guarantees.
When offered by Rhode Island stores, these guarantees offer to meet advertised prices
offered by other Rhode Island stores.  We obtained information about price matching
guarantees from store visits for sample stores and from the newspaper for nonsample
stores.  Hence, our count of price-matching guarantees may be incomplete.  If nonsample
stores offer price-matching guarantees without advertising them in the newspaper, we will
miss those guarantees.  Price matching guarantees are not common among sample stores.
A maximum of 4 stores (of 52 sampled in December 1996) offered such guarantees.
To investigate how post-law change advertising and price matching decisions are
related to pre-law-change prices, we regress (log) prices prior to the change in the law on12
product and time dummies and, separately, dummies for a) whether the store ever
advertises in the window following the change in the law, b) whether the store ever
advertises in the newspaper following the change in the law, and c) whether the store ever
offers a price-matching guarantee.  Perhaps not surprisingly, the Rhode Island stores that
eventually advertise prices in their windows have significantly lower prices (5.45 percent
lower, t = 10.21), prior to June 1996, than other stores.  Stores that eventually advertise in
the paper had prices 4.41 percent below other stores prior to June 1996 (t = -5.81).
Stores offering price matching guarantees have prices averaging 6.86 percent lower than
other stores (t = -9.09).  The fact that stores with lower prices are the ones that choose to
advertise is consistent with the notion that advertising provides a valuable signal to
consumers.  Below, we explore whether advertising causes a decrease in prices.
IV. Measuring the Effect of the Law Change on Price Levels
1. Effect of Price Advertising on Prices
There are a variety of effects of price advertising on prices that one can
contemplate, depending on the mechanism whereby advertising affects prices.  Does the
ability to advertise prices cause firms to advertise and discount particular items ("loss
leaders")?  Or does the ability to advertise cause firms to advertise as a way of
communicating across-the-board low prices?  Does the ability to advertise prices cause
low prices to propagate across store?  That is, does the introduction of the advertising
regime reduce the prices charged at non-advertising stores?  Finally, how do rivals’ ads
affect prices?
                                                                                                                                                                    
12 Store owners informed us that they do a disproportionate share of business, particularly in liquor,13
Corresponding to the various mechanisms, there are four separate effects of
advertising on prices that one can measure, depending on how advertising affects prices.
First, there is the effect of price advertising on the prices of advertised products at the
stores that advertise them.  We term this the "advertised price effect."  This is the effect
that Glazer (1981) measures with longitudinal data on prices of commonly advertised
produce and meat products at grocery stores during and after a newspaper strike.  If
retailers advertise low prices on particular products ("loss leaders") to attract shoppers to
the store, the effects of advertising on prices of advertised goods may not spread to non-
advertised goods.  Hence, the implications of an advertised price effect for a store's prices
generally are not clear.
13  The second effect one might measure is the effect of price
advertising on the prices of all (advertised and non-advertised) products at advertising
stores, or the "advertising store effect."  If a store advertises any of its prices, does it
reduce its prices generally?  Third, one can measure the effect of the price-advertising
regime in the marketplace on the prices at non-advertising stores.  We term this the "non-
advertising store effect."
We can also measure a fourth sort of effect, the effect of rival stores' advertised
prices on the prices of those products at stores not (currently) advertising those products.
To put this concretely, if Korbel Brut is on sale at Marty's Liquor Store, does this affect
                                                                                                                                                                    
around the winter holidays.
13 For example, Lal and Matutes (1994) show that loss-leader pricing can lead to an increase in the prices
of non-sale items.  The question of how loss-leader pricing affects the prices of non-sale items is
analogous to the question of how price advertising effects quality of service in the professions.  See also
Bagwell and Ramey (1994).  In general, researchers find that advertising is associated with lower prices
and no deterioration in service (for a review, see Rizzo and Zeckhauser, 1992).  However, these empirical
studies do not examine the effects of exogenous changes in advertising.14
the price of Korbel Brut at Larry's Liquor Store?   We term this the "rival advertised price
effect" to distinguish it from the own "advertised price effect.”
We seek a measurement framework that will allow us to measure the four effects
outlined above using the change in the Rhode Island law as a source of exogenous
variation.  Because we do not expect the price level to have remained constant in the
absence of the change in the law, the changes in the Rhode Island retail prices beverages
will not measure the effects of the change in the law.  Instead, we need a control variable,
indicating the time pattern that RI retail prices would have followed in the absence of the
change in the law.  We propose three basic approaches to measuring the effect.
2. Differences in Differences in Retail Price
Define psdt as either the natural log or the level of the retail price of product d at
store s during time period t.  We might prefer logs because, as table 1 indicates, the
absolute level of prices varies substantially across products.
14  In the absence of a change
in the law, we model prices with a store effect, a product effect, and a time effect.  In this
differences in differences framework, we measure the effect of the law change on Rhode
Island prices as the deviation in the time pattern of prices in Rhode Island (relative to
Massachusetts) following the change in the law.
￿ ￿ ￿
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where t’= the first time period following the change in the law, D is the number of distinct
products, S is the number of stores in the sample, T the number of total time periods, d
s is15
a store dummy, d
d is a product dummy, d
t is a time dummy, and d
RI is a dummy taking the
value of one for stores in Rhode Island after the ban is lifted.   The effect of the law
change is thus observed in the coefficient f.  We can estimate effects of interest by
interacting dpost
RI with variables indicating whether advertising is in effect for stores or
particular products.
This measurement approach requires the assumption that, in the absence of the
change in the law, the time pattern of prices would be the same in Massachusetts and
Rhode Island.  Because we have three pre-law change time periods in the sample, we can
test this assumption by testing the restriction implicit in equation (1) that Rhode Island
time effects prior to the change in the law are zero.  To see this clearly, consider an
unrestricted model:
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
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where  t’-1 is the last time period prior to the change in the law.  Note that we cannot
estimate a parameter aRI
1 because the interaction of the Rhode Island dummy sum (dpre
RI +
dpost
RI) with the spanning set of time period dummies is linearly dependent on store
dummies.  Formally, the test of our control is a test of whether aRI
1=aRI
2=0.
3. The Rhode Island Markup
Our second approach to measuring the effect of the law change on Rhode Island
retail prices uses Rhode Island wholesale prices as a control for Rhode Island retail prices.
To implement this directly we use the markup (measured as either ln(retail
                                                                                                                                                                    
14 On the other hand, percentage markups are in rough inverse proportion to price, suggesting that price16
price/wholesale price) or as retail price - wholesale price) as the dependent variable,
which we term msdt.  Using RI data alone, we estimate the following equation:
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Here, again, the f coefficient measures the average effect of the change in the law.  We
can test whether the control is appropriate – which here means whether the Rhode Island
markup is stable prior to the change in law – in a way analogous to the way we test
whether Massachusetts prices provide a good control for Rhode Island prices.  That is, we
test whether the RI markup is stable prior to the law change.
4. Differences in Differences in the Markups
Attributing a change in the RI markup to advertising implicitly assumes that the RI
markup would have remained constant had the ban not been lifted.  Alternatively, we can
use our third approach, which measures the effect of the change in the law as the change
in the Rhode Island markup, less the change in the Massachusetts markup in the period
surrounding the change in the law.  This approach is implemented by simply replacing msdt
for psdt in equation (1), and we test whether the control is appropriate analogously.  That
is, we test whether the RI and MA markups move together prior to the law change.
V. Results
1. Are the Controls Valid?
                                                                                                                                                                    
levels are an appropriate dependent variable.  We estimate models both ways below.17
Before reporting estimates of the effects of advertising, we first report tests of the
restrictions implied by each of the measurement approaches.  That is, we test whether the
controls track the RI retail prices prior to the change in the law.  We test each control with
log and the level versions of the dependent variable.  As we indicate in table 4, we do not
reject any of the control approaches.
15
2. Effects on Average Price
Because no approach is systematically rejected, the tests of controls provide no
clear criterion for choosing among measurement approaches.  Hence, we estimate effects
using all three approaches.  Table 5 reports estimates of the overall effect of advertising on
prices.  After the ban is lifted, the Rhode Island markup falls 1.9 percentage points (t = -
5.82).  The absolute markup falls by an average of 15.5 cents (t = -3.45).  See column 1 of
table 5.  However, relative to Massachusetts prices, Rhode Island prices rose 1.56 percent
(t = 3.29).  In levels, the price rises by an average of 8.9 cents (t = 1.41).  See column 2.
While the RI markup fell, relative to the MA markup, the RI markup rose by 1.33
percentage points (t = 2.77).  In levels the markup rises 10.1 cents (t = 1.55).  See column
3.  That the RI markup did not fall relative to the MA markup casts doubt on the effects
measured relative to RI wholesale prices.  Both the MA and RI markups fall after the law
changes in RI.  Hence, it appears inappropriate to attribute the reduction in the RI markup
to the change in the law.  Below, we concentrate on the latter two estimation approaches.
                                                       
15 We also attempted to use the Consumer Price Index for malt beverages, imported and domestic vodka,
and wine in the Northeast as controls for RI prices.  However, we rejected the constancy of the ratio of RI
prices to average Northeast alcoholic CPI indices prior to the change in the RI law.18
These results provide no evidence for a negative effect of price advertising on
prices.  Indeed, the results indicate that RI prices rose under the advertising regime.  It is
important to bear in mind, however, that the estimated effects reported in table 5 group all
stores and products together.  For example, if advertising and non-advertising stores
behave differently, the aggregate effect may obscure the behavior we are trying to
measure.
3.   Do Results Vary by Advertising Status?
If the law of one price held, it would make no difference whether we examined
prices at advertising or non-advertising stores.  However, it is clear from the data that
product prices vary substantially across stores, even after the introduction of advertising.
16
This suggests that the effect of the new advertising regime may be different across stores,
depending on whether and how the stores advertise and whether and where the product is
advertised.  In this section we attempt to measure the separate effects of advertising
outlined above.
For advertising to affect prices, the information must reach consumers.  It seems
reasonable that newspaper advertising will have a larger impact than storefront
advertising.  Storefront advertising presumably only reaches consumers who are either
passing the stores or who have already decided to visit.  Newspaper advertising, by
contrast, exposes a larger group to information about prices.  Hence, we estimate separate
effects, by type of advertising employed.
                                                       
16 For example, the standard deviation (across RI stores) of post-law-change prices of Samuel Adams six-
pack prices is $0.33.  The difference between the prices at stores at the 25
th and 75
th percentiles is $0.46.19
Table 6 reports separate effects of advertising on prices for four groups of
products.  First, we estimate the impact of the advertising regime on prices of products at
non-advertising stores.  Second, we estimate the effect of advertising on prices at stores
that advertise prices of some products, although generally not sample products, in their
windows.
17  Third, we estimate the effect of advertising on the prices of non-advertised
products at newspaper-advertising stores.  Finally, we estimate the effect of advertising on
prices of advertised products at newspaper advertising stores.
The results are rather striking.  While stores running ads reduce advertised
products' prices by about 20 percent, all other effects are small but significantly positive (1
to 2 percent).  Indeed, one cannot reject the hypothesis that all effects, save the advertised
price effect, are identical.  Our advertised price effect is equivalent to, and provides
additional evidence for, the effect of advertising on prices measured in Glazer (1981).
While these estimates show that particular product prices are lower when advertised, these
estimates provide no evidence that price advertising propagates, reducing prices of other
products.
4. Response to Rival Ads
One question we can address is how firms respond to rivals' advertising.  Prior to
the change in the RI law, we asked store owners how they expected the possible change in
the law to affect their businesses.  Most said they would not advertise in the paper.  Asked
how he would respond to possible advertising by a large nearby store (that ultimately
advertised heavily), the owner of a small store that did not ultimately advertise colorfully
                                                       
17 Our data on window advertising simply indicate whether stores advertise prices, not which products’20
responded, "If he lowers his price, I'll lower mine.  I ain't gonna roll over and play dead,
for nobody."
18  Here we attempt to measure this response more systematically.
Using information on whether particular products are advertised, we can estimate
the effect of a rival’s price advertising on prices.  Table 7 reports the results of a
regression similar to that in table 6 but which adds one variable, a dummy which is one
when a product is advertised in the Providence newspaper by any store.  We refer to this
as the "rival advertised price effect."  Recall that the (own) advertised price effect is -20
percent, suggesting that rivals’ advertised products are also 20 percent below their
customary levels.  Table 7 indicates, in contrast to the anecdotal evidence above, that rival
price advertising raises the price of the rival-advertised product by a statistically significant
1 to 2 percent.  This indicates that liquor stores do not respond to rivals' (low) advertised
prices with price reductions.  Rather, on average, firms raise their prices in response to
rivals' price reductions.
Stores’ advertising postures - whether they advertise in the paper, in their windows
only, or not at all - is systematically related to other store features, such as size.
19  Larger,
lower, priced stores are more likely to advertise in the newspaper than smaller stores.  We
might expect stores' responses to rivals' advertising to vary by the
stores' own advertising status.  Table 8 reports four separate rival advertised price effects
for a) products whose prices are advertised at this store, b) non-advertised products at
newspaper-advertising stores, c) products at stores advertising only in their windows, and
                                                                                                                                                                    
prices are advertised.
18 Interview with anonymous Rhode Island liquor store owner, June 25, 1995.
19 On our store visits we subjectively assessed RI store sizes and assigned them values from 1 (smallest) to
5 (largest).  The average value of this subjective size variable for non-advertising stores is 2.2.  The21
d) products at non-advertising stores.  We report only estimates based on differences in
differences in log prices.
20  As in table 7, in column 1 we define a product as rival-
advertised if its price is advertised in the Providence Journal Bulletin by any store
(whether in the sample or not, whether in RI or not).  The results are striking.  Stores'
responses to rival advertising vary systematically by their own advertising posture.  Small,
non-advertising stores raise their prices of rival-advertised products 3 percent more than
they raise their prices generally.  Newspaper-advertising stores, by contrast, raise their
prices of rival-advertised products by substantially less.  Newspaper-advertising stores
raise the prices of products advertised by their rivals, but not by themselves, by 1.47
percent less than they raise prices generally (although this difference is insignificant).  If
advertised by a store and its rival, a product is 11 percent cheaper than if advertised by the
store alone, and this effect is significant, although it is based on only 15 price observations.
When the rival-advertised product effect is allowed to vary, the (own) advertised price
effect (estimated above as roughly -20 percent) drops to -11 percent but remains
significant.
To explore whether the rival-advertised price effect actually reflects a response to
rival behavior, we experimented with various definitions of rivals, including stores within
five and two miles, respectively.  If the effects reflect responses to rival behavior, they
should be stronger, the narrower the definition of a rival.  Columns 2 and 3 show results
for rivals within smaller distances of stores, and the pattern of responses documented
                                                                                                                                                                    
average value for stores advertising in windows but not in the paper is 3.2.  The average for newspaper-
advertising stores is 4.0.
20 Estimates based on differences in differences in the markup are virtually identical.  Results above cast
doubt on the validity of the RI markup approach.22
above becomes more pronounced for narrower definitions of rivals.  Prices of products
advertised by both a store and its rivals within 2 miles are 22 percent lower than products
advertised by the store alone.  Non-advertising stores raise their prices of nearby rivals'
advertised products by 4 percent.  The strengthening of the result pattern with narrower
rival definition supports the interpretation that these are responses to rival behavior.
21
We speculate on the interpretation of these results at V.8 below.
5.  Do Advertisers Sell More?
There are two reasons to ask whether advertising stores sell more.  First, if prices
of advertised products decline at newspaper-advertising stores, then unless advertisers are
mistakenly devoting resources to advertising, sales volumes should increase at the same
stores.  Indeed, one test of reasonableness for the estimated advertised price effects is
whether quantities sold increase at newspaper-advertising stores.  Here we investigate this
possibility.  Second, the average price in the market is the quantity-weighted sum of prices
at particular stores.  Average prices paid can fall even if no retailer changes prices, if
customers shift across stores.  While we have no direct information on quantities sold, by
store, we do have some indirect information in the form of Rhode Island Lottery sales.
Virtually all Rhode Island liquor stores are also Rhode Island Lottery outlets, and we were
able to get Lottery Sales data, by store, for various time periods before and after the
change in the law.  Table 9 reports this information.
                                                       
21 An alternative explanation that we tested and rejected is that our rival-advertised price effects reflect
large stores' stocking up and discounting products in anticipation of impending wholesale price increases.
We tested this hypothesis by regressing log wholesale prices for the eight sample time periods on 33
product fixed effects and a dummy indicating whether some retailer is currently advertising the product in
the newspaper.  The coefficient on the ad variable is insignificant.23
We have lottery sales data for five time periods:
1) Entire-year 1995,
2) Early 1996 (January 1, 1996 to September 30, 1996),
3) Late 1996 (October 1, 1996 to December 31, 1996),
4) Early 1997 (January 1, 1997 to April 22, 1997), and
5) Mid-1997 (April 23, 1997 to September 1, 1997).
The first period, entire-year 1995, is cleanly pre-law change.  The second period,
unfortunately, spans the pre- and post- period.  Roughly two thirds of the period occurs
before, the remainder after.  The latter three periods are cleanly post-law change.  Table 9
reports the fraction of RI Lottery tickets sold, among tickets sold by liquor stores in our
sample, by a) whether they ever employ window advertisements after the law change, and
b) whether they ever employ newspaper price ads after the law change.
The fraction of tickets sold by stores with window ads offers no clear evidence: By
mid 1997 it has fallen relative to its 1995 level.  Much of this decline has occurred by early
1996.  The pattern of sales by stores that run newspaper ads is more suggestive that sales
volume increases at stores that advertise.   While the 9 sample stores that eventually
advertise prices in the newspaper sell 16.38 percent of the lottery tickets in the sample in
1995, they sell 18.40 percent in mid 1997.  The increase in share occurs almost exclusively
after the law change.  Between late 1996 and mid-1997, lottery ticket volumes at
newspaper-advertising stores increase by 7.4 percent.
22
                                                       
22 When we regress daily lottery ticket sales volumes, by store and time period, on store dummies, time
dummies, and newspaper advertising dummies interacted with post-law-change time dummies, the higher
sales at newspaper-advertising stores are not statistically significant.24
We find some evidence of increased quantities sold at advertising stores even
though most prices at advertising stores do not fall.  While this might seem anomalous, it
is important to realize that advertising stores had lower prices than other stores prior to
the permissibility of advertising.  After advertising is allowed, their prices remain lower
than prices at non-advertising stores.
23  Increased sales at price-advertising stores may
arise because price advertising allows stores to communicate their average prices.  This is
the mechanism that Bagwell and Ramey (1994) use to explain a theoretical effect of price
advertising on prices.
6. Effects on Variance
The relevant variance predicted by information theories to decline is the variance
across stores.  We calculate the inter-store variances in two ways.  First, we calculate the
inter-store variation in store fixed effects.  Store fixed effects are calculated from separate
pre and post-law change regressions of the price level on product dummies, store dummies
and time dummies.  We run separate regressions for RI and MA (four regressions in all).
Table 10 reports the standard deviations of the store effects.  The s.d. of store fixed effects
rises from $0.620 in RI before the law change to $0.735 afterwards.  At the same time, the
s.d. of MA prices rises from $0.689 to $0.783.  Both increases are statistically significant.
The RI absolute increase exceeds the MA increase, so it is clear even without formal
statistical tests that price dispersion does not decline in RI relative to MA.
                                                       
23 Regressions of post-law-change log prices on product dummies and dummies for how stores advertise
indicate that window- and newspaper-advertising stores' prices are, respectively, 4 and 5 percent lower
than prices at non-advertising stores.25
Our second test compares regression standard errors from regressions of price
levels on product dummies and time dummies.  These statistics reflect not only inter-store
price variation but also within-store variation, after accounting for product effects.  We
run four separate regressions: MA pre, MA post, RI pre, and RI post.  Results, in table 9,
mirror results above:  The standard error of the regression increases in both states.  It
increases more in RI.  Again, there is no evidence of a reduction in price dispersion.
across stores before and after.
7. Does Price-Matching Affect Prices?
Recent theoretical work (Edlin, 1997) suggests an anti-competitive effect of price-
matching guarantees on prices, so we also investigate whether price-matching guarantees
affect prices.  Of the prices in our sample, 87 observations cover prices at stores with such
guarantees in effect.   In addition 169 observations cover prices of products at stores
within two miles of stores with matching guarantees.  Without exception, such guarantees
for stores in our sample offer to match prices advertised in the newspaper by other Rhode
Island stores.  We ask four questions of the data: First, do matching stores charge lower
prices than non-matching stores?  Second, does the effect of the change in the law vary at
matching stores?  Third, does the effect of the change in the law vary by proximity to
matching stores?  Finally, does the tendency to advertise in the newspaper vary by
proximity to price-matching stores?
Just as stores that would ultimately become price-matching stores charged lower
prices prior to the change in the law, they continue to charge lower prices afterward.  A
regression of RI post-law-change log prices on product effects and a dummy for whether26
the store ever offers a price-matching guarantee indicates that matching stores' prices are
4.42 percent lower (t = -6.44).
When the overall effect of the change in the law is allowed to vary for stores that
offer price-matching guarantees, we find that their prices rise by 0.80 percent less,
although the difference is not significant (t = -0.57).
There is weak evidence of a chilling effect of matching guarantees on other stores'
price discounting.  The effect of the change in the law on prices is 0.82 percent higher for
stores within two miles of matching stores, although this effect is also not significant (t =
0.93).  Perhaps more interesting, stores near price-matching stores are less likely to
advertise in the newspaper than are other stores.  A regression of an indicator for whether
a store advertises in the newspaper at any point after the law changes on a constant, a
subjective measure of store size, and an indicator for whether stores within two miles
match prices at any point after the law change yields a coefficient of -0.19 (t = -1.76) on
the latter variable.
8. Speculation on the Pattern of Estimated Effects
The pattern of price changes documented above begs explanation:  How could the
introduction of advertising raise prices in the many circumstances documented above?
Here we offer some speculation.
It is fairly simple to construct an explanation for rising prices in a single-product
environment.  Spatial differentiation gives stores some monopoly power, particularly over
consumers with limited mobility.  Indeed, consumers may have different price elasticities
of demand for retail alcoholic beverages according to their mobility (as well as other27
factors).  The introduction of price advertising makes consumers better informed and
attracts elastic demanders away from their local stores to low-priced advertising stores.
The customers remaining at the local stores have relatively inelastic demand, and store
owners may increase profits by raising prices for their relatively trapped local customers.
24
In a multi-product environment a somewhat more complicated explanation is
required.  In our results a rival's advertising of a product induces non-advertising stores to
raise the price of the rival-advertised product more than they raise the prices of other
products.  This phenomenon would be rationalized by the single-product explanation if
demands were independent across products.  However, if customers choose stores
according to average prices - for example if customers' usual consumption bundles include
both advertised and non-advertised products - then we would expect rival advertisements
to attract customers generally, not only in a product-specific way.  Then, under the sort of
explanation offered above, we would expect small stores to raise prices in the same way
on all products, whether or not advertised by rivals.
Thus, the two buyer-type explanation rationalizes our results under the additional
assumption that demands are at least somewhat independent across products (i.e. that the
price of product 1 at a store does not affect demand for product 2 at that store).  We have
only anecdotal evidence concerning the dependence of demands across products.  In
discussions with store owners concerning the efficacy of advertising, many owners
dismissed advertising saying that it attracts “cherry pickers,” a term they use for customers
who patronize their stores only to purchase deeply discounted advertised items.  Clearly,
                                                       
24 Grabowski and Vernon (1992) present evidence of an analogous phenomenon, that drug manufacturers
raised the prices of branded drugs following the introduction of generics.28
additional information about the dependence of demands across products would be useful
for assessing the results.
We can rule out one explanation for the rival-advertised price effect.  On our visits
to liquor stores, we overheard some liquor distributors informing the retail store manager
about coming price increases for certain products.  If some, but not all, managers react to
expected price increases by stocking up on the product and running a sale, then we would
observe an apparent increase in rival advertised prices.  But such an increase would be
caused by an increase in wholesale prices, not changes in demand elasticity as described
above.  However, we find no evidence that wholesale prices of advertised products
increase either just prior to sales or during sales.
VI. Conclusion
Although both conventional wisdom and existing studies, based largely on cross-
sectional evidence, support the idea that price advertising reduces the mean and variance
of prices, we find little support for the conventional view.  Making use of exogenous
variation in price advertising, we find that while stores reduce the prices of advertised
products - particularly if also advertised by nearby rivals - advertising raises the prices of
other products, both at advertising and non-advertising stores.   Our results also shed light
on competitive responses to rivals' advertising.  Small, non-advertising stores raise their
prices on products advertised by rivals beyond their baseline price increase induced by
advertising.  By contrast, rival advertising reduces larger, advertising stores' price
increases on rival-advertised products.  Sales volumes, measured by lottery ticket sales,
increase at stores that advertise in the newspaper relative to stores that do not advertise.29
Advertising stores have lower prices before and after the introduction of price advertising,
so advertising may promote communication about prices.  We find weak evidence that
price-matching guarantees chill rival price advertising.  Ours is by no means the last word
on the effect of price advertising on prices.  We believe that additional studies using panel
data and broad coverage of products would be useful.30
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Table 1
Products in the Sample
Product Obs. Avg. Price
Liquor 2667
Bacardi 80 proof rum (0.75 liter) 224 $9.43
Bacardi 80 proof rum (1 liter) 298 $12.13
Jack Daniels Tennessee Whiskey (0.75 liter) 281 $14.94
Jack Daniels Tennessee Whiskey (1 liter) 457 $19.00
Kaluha (0.75 liter) 283 $15.07
Kaluha (1 liter) 436 $20.49
Stolichnaya Vodka 80 proof (0.75 liter) 130 $15.42
Stolichnaya Vodka 80 proof (1 liter) 134 $19.03
Tanqueray Gin (0.75 liter) 180 $15.91
Tanqueray Gin (1 liter) 244 $20.08
Beer 1706
Amstel Light 6-pack 56 $6.64
Budweiser 12-pack (cans) 491 $8.44
Coors 12-pack (cans) 173 $8.79
Heineken 6-pack (bottles) 195 $6.61
Labatts Blue 6-pack (bottles) 56 $5.67
Miller High Life 12-pack (cans) 138 $6.76
Molson 6-pack (cans) 78 $5.78
Narragansett 6-pack (cans) 28 $3.16
Sam Adams 6-pack (bottles) 491 $6.27
Wine 915
E & J Gallo Cabernet Sauvignon 81 $4.68
E & J Gallo Chardonnay 394 $4.76
Fetzer Cabernet Sauvignon 41 $7.47
Fetzer Sundial Chardonnay 53 $7.27
Glen Ellen Chardonnay 57 $5.76
Glen Ellen Merlot 46 $5.81
Mouton Cadet (red) 54 $8.48
Mouton Cadet (white) 56 $8.37
Sutter Home Cabernet Sauvignon 60 $5.38
Sutter Home Chardonnay 73 $5.54
Champagne 1192
Freixenet Brut Negro Champagne 431 $8.07
Korbel Brut Champagne 361 $10.80
Moet & Chandon Brut 156 $30.07
Moet & Chandon White Star 244 $26.04
Total 648033
Table 2
































June '95 22 0 0 0 0 0
Sept. '95 30 0 0 0 0 0
Feb. '96 15 0 0 0 0 0
June '96 51 17 3 10 4 15 1 2
Sept. '96 22 6 1 6 1 3 1 0
Dec. '96 52 19 5 15 27 45 4 0
Mar. '97 52 24 6 17 16 25 2 3















Logs 2.013 0.959 0.666
  Prob-val. (0.14) (0.39) (0.522)
Levels 0.068 0.788 2.359











Note: These are tests, respectively, of the hypotheses that,  prior to the
change in the law, (a) the RI markup is stable, (b) the MA and RI prices
move together, and (c) the MA and RI markups move together.36
Table 5
Overall Effect of Advertising on Prices












Logs -1.89%* 1.56%* 1.33%*
  t-stat (-5.82) (3.29) (2.77)
Levels $-0.155* $0.089 $0.101
  t-stat (-3.45) (1.41) (1.55)
Notes: T-statistics in parentheses.  All regressions include product and
store fixed effects.  The RI markup regression is estimated on RI data
only.  The other regressions include time period dummies and are
estimated on RI and MA data.  See text for details.37
Table 6






































































Notes: T-statistics in parentheses.  All regressions include product and store fixed effects.  The RI
markup regression is estimated on RI data only.  The other regressions include time period
dummies and are estimated on RI and MA data.  See text for details.38
Table 7































































Notes: T-statistics in parentheses.  All regressions include product and store fixed effects.  The RI
markup regression is estimated on RI data only.  The other regressions include time period
dummies and are estimated on RI and MA data.  See text for details.39
Table 8
Stores' Responses to Rival Advertising,
by Store Advertising Status and Distance to Rival





























































































Number of Observations 6480 6480 6480
Notes: T-statistics in parentheses.  Number of observations relevant to cell in brackets.  All
regressions include product and store fixed effects and time-period dummies and are estimated
on RI and MA data.  See text for details.40
Table 9
Percent of Rhode Island Lottery Sales by Advertisers
















25 31 69.44 67.65 67.84 67.94 66.50
No Window 20 30.56 32.35 32.16 32.06 33.50
Newspaper
26 9 16.38 16.44 17.14 17.35 18.40
No
Newspaper
42 83.62 83.56 82.86 82.65 81.60
                                                       
25 Number of stores ever employing window price ads at the time of data collection (though June 1997).
26 Number of stores ever employing newspaper price ads in effect during months of price data collection
(through June 1997).41
Table 10
Price Dispersion in RI and MA before and After Change
Rhode Island Massachusetts
Standard deviation of store effects
Pre $0.620 $0.689
Post $0.735 $0.783
Standard error of regression of prices on product and time dummies
Pre $1.018 $1.248
Post $1.283 $1.320TUFTS UNIVERSITY 
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